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Legal Issues Arising with Civilian UAS Integration

Payload & Cargo
Specific Legal Issues

1st, 2nd, 4th , 5th, 10th, 14th
Amendment Issues

Civil Liability & Criminal
Culpability Issues

Product Liability, Risk, &
Insurance Issues

Administrative/Airspace
Issues

Safety Issues

Security Issues
Privacy Torts

UAS integration into the national airspace opens up a variety of legal issues
that must be addressed in light of both UAS airframe and payload
technologies.
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Legal Issues Arising with Civilian UAS Integration

Safety Issues: Collision Avoidance, Ground Safety, Operator Safety
Security Issues: Data Security, Interception Prevention, Hostile Takeover
Privacy Issues: Personal Privacy, Data Privacy
Payload Specific Issues: Hazards (Pesticides), Freight Regulations, etc.

Administrative Issues: Aircraft Registration, Operations Permits, etc.
2nd Amendment Issues: Property Protection, Livestock Protection, etc.
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Complexity of Technical Issues

Complexities arise as issues compound with each other or conflict with
each other:
Data Security + Data Privacy = Compound Issue
Payload Issues + Safety Issues = Compound Issue
Safety versus Privacy = Compound Issue

It is vital to view UAS integration in the national airspace as a multi-legal
and multi-technical issue situation.
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Many Facets of Security

Many facets of UAS security: Data security, physical security, personnel
security, systems security, operations security.
Information Assurance is linked to all of them.
Each area has its own discipline.
Example: Physical security = aircraft security, ground station security,
hangar security, equipment security, etc.
Our focus will be UAS data security and information assurance areas.
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Cascading Effect of Security

Security cascades into other areas rapidly making it a central issue in
UAS operations.
Data Security Breach

Privacy Tort

Civil Liability

Software Vulnerability

Safety Issue

Product Liability

Data Integrity Issue

Safety Issue

Criminal Culpability
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Information Assurance
Fundamentals
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Information Assurance Fundamentals

Confidentiality

"Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and
proprietary information..." [44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542]
"A loss of confidentiality is the unauthorized disclosure of information"
UAS security measures examples: restricted access to data through
encryption, employment of pilot and user authentication methodologies,
anti-spoofing technologies
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Information Assurance Fundamentals

Integrity
"Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and
includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity...”
[44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542]
"A loss of integrity is the unauthorized modification or destruction of
information"
UAS security measures examples: encrypted data signatures, stratified
authentication to restrict access, hardened onboard data storage
systems, anti-spoofing technology
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Information Assurance Fundamentals

Availability
"Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information...”
[44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542]
"A loss of availability is the disruption of access to or use of information
or an information system"

UAS security measures examples: redundant ground control systems,
redundant communication systems, backup navigation systems, backup
data systems including real time backups
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Full Spectrum UAS Information Assurance
Personnel Security

UAS

Computer Security

INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Physical Security
Emission Security
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Full Spectrum UAS Information Assurance
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}

UAS Info
Systems
Security

Threats, Vulnerabilities, & Risk
THREAT

Vulnerability

Capabilities, intentions and
attack methods of
adversaries to exploit, or
any circumstance or event
with the potential to cause
harm to information or an
information system.

Weakness in an
information system,
cryptographic system,
security procedures,
hardware, software or
other components that
could be exploited.

RISK

Residual Risk

A combination of the
likelihood that a threat will
occur, the likelihood that
the threat will result in an
adverse impact, and the
severity of the resulting
impact.

The portion of risk
that remains after
security measures
have been applied.
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Defense in Depth

Protected
Domain
Intruder

= Vulnerability
Layers of Defense
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The UAS as a System of
Systems
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UAS as a System of Systems
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UAS as a System of Systems

An UAS is not merely an aircraft but in systems engineering terms, a
“system of systems” consisting of the aircraft, the ground station, the
GPS satellite constellation, the communication infrastructure (L-Band,
C-Band), the launch & recovery infrastructure, the personnel, etc.
All aspects of these systems must be secured and maintain information
assurance, as data is constantly transmitted in the form of information
and commands.
The following technical diagrams demonstrate the critical need for
information assurance and system security in complex UAS operations.
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Information Assurance
Threats to UAS
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UAS Information Assurance Threats

As can be seen UAS operations have computational and communicational
complexity giving rise to increasing risk to information assurance threats.
Attacks can occur in:
- Embedded UAS Systems
- Software
- Hardware
- Combination of the Above
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Embedded Systems Threats

Embedded security is a major concern for UAS (as well as manned
aircraft and satellite systems)
Embedded systems tend to have generic hardware & software, which in
many cases do not have a development process with mandatory security
protocols (Example: Computer chips from China)
This can result in built in vulnerabilities in the chips (integrated circuit
hardware) and the software that drives the chips.
The interconnectivity of the system of systems makes these
vulnerabilities pervasive throughout the entire system. (Example: A virus
in a UAS chip can spread to the ground station or a networked UAS)
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Embedded Systems Threats

Cyber attack acts impede the physical processing of the controllers; this
is what makes it dangerous and deadly.
Malicious manipulations of the controllers can lead to logic issues
resulting in software corruption or in the worst case scenario physical
damage to the hardware of the system due to erroneous electrical
impulses in the physical manifestations of the logic carried out in the
electronics attached to the controllers.
The result = damage to the UAS = catastrophic failure or malicious control
of the UAS from rearranged logic signals
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Embedded Systems Threats

Case Study
The Actel ProASIC chip in the new Boeing 787 had a backdoor that could
allow chip to be taken over via Internet

A person using the entertainment system in the passenger cabin could
take over the avionics and control the aircraft!
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Viruses and Malware

Viruses hit the US military drone fleet in 2011 including the Predator and
Reaper drones through ground station viruses
The keystrokes of operators were logged and sent to outside (potentially
enemy) sources
Despite repeated efforts, the viruses kept coming back onto the systems
Key Logging Malware the central cause of the incident
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Software Exploits

In 2011 Iran captured a US RQ-170 Sentinel stealth drone
Iran claims it exploited a vulnerability in the software and caused the
system logic to allow access to flight controls
In 2009 Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have downloaded live
unencrypted video streams from American predator drones
These videos were captured through software exploits of the system
The equipment used by the militants was valued at less than $100
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GPS Spoofing

GPS civilian signals are open standard, free accessibility signals

Transparency and predictability have created a major weakness – the
ability to be spoofed which means it can be replicated easily
This vulnerability was demonstrated by Professor Todd Humphreys of
University of Texas at Austin & he testified to Congress on this
vulnerability
The demonstration proved that a UAS could be hijacked and crashed by
spoofing its live GPS signal
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Types of GPS Spoofing

Live Satellite Signal Spoofing: user a GPS signal generator, like a fake
satellite, to synthesize a navigationally consistent signal set and overlay
and substitute them for the actual satellite signals
Software Code Spoofing: The receiver is actually uploaded with malware
which makes it appear as functioning normally but the location of the
UAS is altered
Differential Corrections Spoofing: the digital corrections signal is actually
spoofed. DCS enhances GPS accuracy to 1 meter so this is a limited
attack
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UAS Information Assurance Threats

Overall, research and awareness is key in the developing realm of UAS
information assurance and security
Information assurance starts from manufacturing and ends with daily
operational security and awareness
Legal, information assurance, and aviation professionals need to push
forward on the area of information assurance in the future to ensure it
stays in the forefront of UAS operations
Continuing education and training in IA and security are vital to maintain
UAS security
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U.S. Critical
Infrastructure
Protection
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UAS and Aviation Critical Infrastructure Protection

The critical infrastructures of the United States have only been recently,
in the past decade and a half, been recognized as a target for cyber
attacks.
However, during this time the government has acted, albeit slowly to
ensure that the national critical infrastructure is adequately protected as
a national security measure.
In this section we will briefly discusses the acts and directives meant to
protect the nation's critical infrastructure from cyber attacks, focusing
on the aviation sector.
Understanding the US critical infrastructure protection directives is
critical in UAS security and information assurance implementation
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UAS and Aviation Critical Infrastructure Protection
The Presidential Policy Directive PPD-21 that President Obama signed on
February 12, 2013 entitled "Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience"
advanced a "national unity of effort to strengthen and maintain secure,
functioning, and resilient critical infrastructures".
This directive seeks three specific strategic imperatives that will drive the
Federal approach to strengthen the security of the critical infrastructure:
•
Refine and clarify functional relationships across the Federal
government to advance the national unity of effort to strengthen the
critical infrastructure security and resilience;
•
Enable effective information exchange by identifying baseline data
and systems requirements for the Federal Government; and
•
Implement an integration and analysis function to inform planning
and operations decisions regarding critical infrastructure.
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UAS and Aviation Critical Infrastructure Protection
The PPD-21 places a significant emphasis on research and development of
security for critical infrastructure, particularly the cyber infrastructure
through :
•
Promoting research and development to enable the secure and
resilient design and construction of critical infrastructure and more
secure accompanying cyber technology;
•
Enhancing modeling capabilities to determine potential impacts on
critical infrastructure of an incident or threat scenario, as well as
cascading effects on other sectors;
•
Facilitating initiatives to incentivize cyber security investments and
the adoption of critical infrastructure design features that strengthen all
hazards security and resilience; and
•
Prioritizing efforts to support the strategic guidance issues by the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
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UAS and Aviation Critical Infrastructure Protection
Note the increased emphasis on cyber security as compared to the earlier
laws and directives concerning critical infrastructure.
The PDD-21 also develops 16 critical infrastructure sectors and assigns
oversight of these sectors to a Federal Agency.
The critical infrastructure area of “Transportation Systems” is a distinct
area and is assigned to both the Department of Transportation and the
Department of Homeland Security
This has significant implications for UAS security development,
implementation and enforcement
Thus the DHS, DOT as well as the FAA will have a significant set of inputs
into UAS security issues, regulations, and matters in general

It is wise to keep an eye on the critical infrastructure developments at the
federal level in this arena to see the trends in the security aspects of UAS
implementation and integration into the national airspace
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UAS in the Critical National Infrastructure
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Conclusion

UAS security is an emerging field as is UAS technology and UAS law

Security must be placed high in importance with safety and privacy
Information Assurance and Security professionals must be kept in the loop
along with legal and aviation professionals
New information assurance and security technology must be followed
carefully and merged into the UAS arena
Security affects all areas of UAS operations and as such must be treated as
a compound issue
Security is everyone’s responsibility
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Questions?
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